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Through the use of extensive field research and an original international questionnaire, the 
main sources of the leapfrogging development of the Japanese machine-tool industry in the 
past 19 years were investigated.  Past studies have emphasized the strategic R&D alliance with 
superlative computerized numerical control (CNC) makers, the extensive use of outsourcing 
from excellent precision parts’ suppliers, and the extraordinary development of automakers. 
This paper critically considered these factors and verified their inadequacy  in explaining the 
further development of this industry in the 1990s. Hence, attention was paid to the significant 
roles of “intrafirm factors” such as: (a) the simultaneous and cross-functional information 
sharing system at an early stage of  new product development processes; (b) the positive and 
early participation of frontline skilled workers in assembly or machining shops; and (c) the 
existence of highly skilled assemblymen or machinists. The significant roles of these intrafirm 
factors were robustly validated by the statistical analysis of the questionnaire survey as well as 
by the results of our field research. The results showed striking similarities between the 
Japanese and the German machine-tool makers and notable dissimilarities between the two and 
the US makers. 
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ntil the mid 1970s, the Japanese machine-tool industry had  lagged behind  its U.S. and 
German counterparts. Indeed, in 1975, Japan was the fourth largest producer behind the 
(former) Soviet Union.  First  was the U.S., followed by (formerly) West Germany. The advent 
of CNC 1  complex lathes and machining centers (MC), however,  drastically changed the 
situation. In 1982, the Japanese machine-tool industry produced the largest amount (US 
dollars) of machine tools in the world and has maintained this leading position for 19 years.  
ost of the past studies which observed this leapfrogging development (e.g. Finegold et. al. 
(1994a and 1994b), Fleischer (1997), Kobayashi and Ohdaka (1995), and Mazzoleni (1999)) 
have emphasized the following “interfirm factors:” a) the strategic R&D alliance with 
superlative CNC makers such as Fanuc, Mitsubishi Electric, and Yasukawa Electric that 
provide optimal control software as well as CNC devices or servo motors;  b) the extensive  use 
of outsourcing from excellent precision part's suppliers of bearings, ballscrews 2  or linear  
guideways, for example NSK, NTN, and THK; and c) the extraordinary development of the 
auto industry3, represented by Toyota, Nissan, and Honda and the huge induced demand from 
these “demanding and knowledgeable” users. 4  In particular, the collaboration with CNC 
producers is the universally repeated and emphasized factor. 
hese factors have certainly played very important roles. As clarified in this paper, however, 
these interfirm factors do not sufficiently explain the further development of this industry 
during the 1990s. Markets for CNC and precision parts have been so globalized that stable and 
prompt key-part procurement could no longer be a crucial constraint for foreign competitors. 
Moreover, although the export ratio of Japanese machine-tools was 30  - 40% (30-40%) until 
the early 1990s, it exceeded 65% in 1995 and reached about 75% in 1999. In this regard, an 
increase in demand came mostly from foreign manufacturers. 
 
1 Computerized Numerical Control. 
2 Special screws that change rotative movement into linear movement. 
3 The Japanese auto industry became the world’s largest producer in 1981. 
4 In addition to these three factors, some may maintain that the strong governmental roles, 
especially as played by the MITI, should be included. There are, however, contrasting views on 
this point and thus, we do not consider this factor. For more details on this point, see Friedman 




In this paper, we will emphasize the role of the overlooked “intrafirm factors” on the 
development of the Japanese machine-tool industry in the 1990s: (a) the existence of a 
simultaneous and cross-functional information sharing system conducted at an early stage of 
the new product development processes; (b) the positive and early participation of frontline 
skilled assemblymen or machinists in such a process; and (c) the existence of highly skilled 
assemblymen or machinists who could troubleshoot their unknown problems in a prompt and 
proper manner.5  
As is well known, modern CNC machine-tools have become much more complex, both 
mechanically and electrically. Even at the system design phase where targeted market needs are 
conceptualized, mechanical designers have to bear in mind the various kinds of interference 
problems among key unit parts. Except for very rare cases, however, it becomes almost 
impossible even for first-rate designers to do  this. Thus, to reduce the development lead-time 
for new machines or to not frequently return to previous development stages, a simultaneous 
and cross-functional information sharing system becomes very essential. 
The main purpose of this paper is to validate these conjectures based on both  careful and 
comprehensive field research and a statistical analysis of our original questionnaire survey 
simultaneously conducted among Japanese, US and German machine-tool makers. Despite its 
importance, there are only a few studies that have tried to investigate this subject in a 
comprehensive manner. There are several papers included in Jurgens (2000)6 where a similar 
point  was considered based on a few case studies of German, Italian, Japanese, and US 
machine-tool makers.7 All of these papers, however, only paid attention to a specific country, 
                    
5  We note here that most of these skilled workers are not conventional “craft-types” but 
“problem-solving-types” of people. Based on  relevant systematic as well as experimental 
knowledge, the problem-solving types  can promptly  discover the causes and effects of various 
kinds of actual and potential machine troubles and properly prevent or alleviate them. A 
detailed description of problem-solving types of skills  in the auto or auto-parts industry is 
provided in Koike, Chuma, and Ohta (2001).  
6 Lippert (2000), Rolfo (2000) and Kobayashi (2000). 
7 Finegold, et. al. (1994a, 1994b) tried exhaustively to figure out why the US machine-tool 
makers had declined so much in the 1980s. Their research is based on a large number of 
hearings from various people and on macro data analyses. They, however, did not directly take 




the German-US difference or to new product development processes per se, and did not clarify 
the crucial reasons for why such an international difference came into being. Moreover, 
although  each paper’s subject varied, only two cases per country were discussed at best. Lastly, 
the conjectures proposed in each paper were not statistically tested.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section, the outline of the research 
method will be introduced. In Section 3, we will critically review the three interfirm factors. 
Section 4 will be the main part of this paper. In the first half of this section, the importance of 
the overlooked intrafirm factors will be discussed based mainly on  field research and the 
questionnaire survey. In the second half of this section, the importance of these intrafirm 
factors will be statistically confirmed. The final section summarizes the results. 
 
2. The Research Method 
2.1. About the Field Research 
We have investigated twelve Japanese machine-tool makers, two CNC makers, and one 
precision parts’ maker. Three German machine-tool makers were also examined, whereas, 
regrettably, US producers were not considered. Among Japanese machine-tool makers, seven  
were large-scale producers with more than 1000 full-time employees and the others had fewer 
than 500 full-time employees. 
The field research was conducted from the end of September 1996 to the end of March 2000. 
For each company, we interviewed foremen from assembly shops, chief designers or engineers 
in Design and Development (D&D) sections, and chief officers in the personnel department. 
Interviews normally took two hours and were conducted at least twice for each person.  This 
rule did not apply to German makers or one of the CNC makers. 
 
2.2. Questionnaire Survey 
In addition to field research, between February and April of 2000 we also conducted a 
questionnaire survey for the Japanese, German and US machine-tool makers. Japanese samples 
included all establishments (1750) that were included in  the of Census of Manufacturers 
(MITI) list in 1997. More concretely, they belong to the metal-cutting machine industry, the 
metal forming machine industry, or the machine-tool related parts, attachments or cutting-tool 
industries. Mainly due to the budget constraint, samples for the first two industries were 
                                                           




limited to  those with more than five full-time workers, while the third industry was limited  to 
those with more than twenty full-time workers. 
The US samples consist of all machine-tool makers (366) that belong to the AMT 
(Association of Manufacturing Technology) and machine-tool related makers ( 517) that 
belong to the NTMA (National Tooling and Machining Association). The  list of names that we 
used was compiled from the home page of each association. 
The German samples included all machine-tool makers ( 273) that belong to VDW (Verein 
Deutscher Werkzeugmash Cinenfabriken e.V.) or VDMA (Verband Deutscher Maschinen und 
Anlagenbau e.V.) and are listed in the Red Book CD-ROM issued by  these organizations. 
The questionnaire was to be filled out by supervisory personnel in assembly and/or 
machining shops. In reality, however, most interviewees who were identifiable were division or 
section chiefs of production sections. The response rate for each country is as follows: 30% in 
Japan, 22% in the US, and 12% in Germany.   
 
3. “Interfirm Factors” for Leapfrogging Development: Critical Assessment 
3.1. Strategic R&D Alliances with CNC Makers 
It is well known that the development of the Japanese machine-tool industry  was attained 
by using general-purpose CNC lathes and MCs (Kobayashi and Ohdaka (1995)). Among them, 
machines ranging from $200,000 to $500,000 are currently competitive in the world market. 
Most of the CNC and servo motors with which  these machines are equipped are produced by 
Fanuc, Mitsubishi Electric, or Yasukawa Electric. The domestic and world market share of 
Fanuc is 70% or 50% respectively.8 
The contribution of these CNC makers to the machine-tool industry is considerable. This 
point can be partially confirmed by the cost ratio of CNC-related parts or software to the total 
cost of machine-tool building. It sometimes amounts to even 30-  40%.9     
To equip their new machines with CNC and control software, machine-tool makers 
normally need to have close technological collaboration with CNC makers. This is mainly 
because to optimally achieve the motion control of their machines, knowledge of both machine 
characteristics and CNC units becomes essential. To differentiate their machines, machine-tool 
                    
8 The data is based on Kaisha-Shiki-Ho (Quarterly Financial Reports on Listed Companies) by 
Toyokeizai Shinpo-sha. 




makers are also quite eager to add their unique optional (software) functions to the existing 
ready-made functions. 10  Moreover, CNC makers eventually earn proprietorship of the 
interface between the mechanical parts of machines and CNC devices. Therefore, the 
relationship between machine-tool makers and CNC producers tends to be exclusive and 
long-term. 
For example, in the case of Makers A and B that are competing for the number one position 
in Japan, each maker has its own CNC division within the Nagoya Works of Mitsubishi Electric 
and obtains specific CNC supplies. Mitsubishi’s engineers also frequently visit Makers A and 
B independently, especially during the new machine development processes. Furthermore, 
Maker C, that has a very powerful R&D control division, has had quite a long-term relationship 
with Fanuc and has retained the proprietary and extensive Fanuc-CNC interfaces. 
The machine-tool division chief of Maker D made the following comments concerning this 
point. Maker D produces Swiss-type automatic NC turret lathes that have unique multi-axes & 
a multi-functional optimal control system. 
 
CNC makers derive most of their profits, not from selling CNC devices themselves, but 
from developing the corresponding made-to-order software. In fact, it is quite common for 
Fanuc to collaborate with various machine-tool makers to develop and fine-tune their 
software. As a result of  this collaboration, substantial knowledge has been transferred 
from machine-tool makers to CNC makers. In addition, Fanuc and Mitsubishi retain 
Gulliver’s share so that the best-practiced technology of competitive machine-tool makers 
shall effectively spill over to machine-tool makers  that are relatively weak in having 
motion control of their machines. 
 
Even during the 1990s,  was the close collaboration between machine-tool and CNC makers  
prevalent only in Japan? To be sure, Mozzoleni (1999) and Finegold et. al. (1994) ascribe one 
of the main weaknesses of the US machine-tool makers in the 1970s or 1980s to the 
arm’s-length relationship between machine-tool and CNC makers. 11   Since around 1989, 
                    
10 This point is based on our field research 
11 The same thing is applicable to the German machine-tool industry (Englmannn et. al. (1994) 




however, Fanuc has run a joint venture with GE in the US and Siemens in Germany. 12 
Furthermore, as a result of Fanuc and Mitsubishi’s foreign direct investment, their superior 
CNC devices and related control software have become more accessible globally. 13  
Reflecting the situation, for example, in the famous Chicago machine-tool show in 
September 1999, 33% of exhibited machines were equipped with GE’s (hence Fanuc’s) CNC, 
14% with Fanuc’s, 9% with Siemens’s, and 6% with Mitsubishi’s. In the Paris show in May 
1999, the corresponding number was Fanuc: 35%, Siemens: 18%, Heidenhein: 10%, and 
Mitsubishi: 5%. In contrast, in the Tokyo show in October 2000, Fanuc’s share was 72%, while 
Mitsubishi’s was 10%, and Ohkuma’s 4%. 14 
Although the existence of powerful CNC makers in Japan contributes to the 
competitiveness of the Japanese machine-tool makers, it becomes very difficult from these 
facts to maintain an argument that their strategic R&D alliance with CNC makers has been the 
major source of Japanese machine-tool industry leadership even in the 1990s.  
                   
Lippert (2000) also reported that, except for the German maker of standard low-cost MCs,15  
the lead-time for machine development16 was 24 months for the US maker of standard low-cost 
MCs, 30 months for the US maker of customized high-tech CNC milling machines and 33 
months for the German maker of customized high-tech CNC lathes.  In contrast, according to 
our field research of 12 machine-tool makers, the corresponding lead-time for their  top 
machines was 10 to 12 months without exception.17 Such a huge difference is hard to explain  
 
12 Siemens, however, had cancelled this joint venture later. 
13 This is one of the strong reasons why Taiwanese machine-tool makers have become very 
competitive in relatively low-cost machine-tools. The same logic must be applied to the Korean 
machine-tool industry. Korean makers, however, are  much less competitive than the 
Taiwanese. Jeong (1996) indicates, as one of the main reasons for such a weakness, a 
qualitative skills deficiency due to low investment  in skill development. We also note here that 
Korea  banned imports of Japanese machine-tools until 2000. 
14 All data come from Nikkei Shimbun. 
15 The development lead time for this maker was 16 months. 
16  The lead-time for machine development consists of the following four phases: Concept 
Phase, Product Engineering Phase, Process Engineering Phase, and Production Phase. For 
details, see Lippert (2000). 




using only  collaboration of machine-tool makers with CNC producers. 
 
3.2. Extensive use of outsourcing from excellent precision part's suppliers 
In addition to CNC and servomotors, machine-tools consist of parts such as main spindles 
and bearings and high-speed motors for them, guideways and ballscrews or linear motors, and 
cast iron products such as beds, columns, or saddles. The precision of machines and their 
production lead-time crucially depend on the performance of these parts as well as their prompt 
and stable distribution. Technological innovations embodied in these parts also directly 
enhance the performance of machine-tools. Additionally, the high quality of cast iron 
significantly influences the precision durability of machines. 
It is definitely true that Japanese machine-tool makers have obtained a considerable 
advantage by depending on outsourcing from top-rated Japanese precision parts’ makers. Most 
of the bearings come from NSK or NTN, ballscrews from NSK, Tsubaki-Nakajima, or Kuroda 
Seiko, and linear-motion guideways from THK or NSK.18  Reflecting  this situation, most of  
the machine-tool makers we visited claimed that their payments to these precision parts’ 
makers  took 10 to 20% of their total machine-building costs.  
These precision parts’ makers, however, were globalized in the 1990s. For example, in the 
case of NSK, the ratio of overseas production, overseas sales and foreign workers  was 30%, 
70% and 40% respectively. THK  also sold 25- 30% of its products abroad. In this sense, the 
extensive use of outsourcing from top-rated precision parts’ makers still could not explain the 
wide gap of machine development lead-time indicated in the previous section.  
 
3.3. Extraordinary development of the auto industry 
The impact of the auto industry on the machine-tool industry is enormous. Indeed, domestic 
auto or autoparts’ makers directly create about  30-40% of the induced domestic demand for 
machine-tools. This number adds up to about  60- 70% if the auto industry related demand from 
the general machinery industry (e.g., die-making industry) and the electrical machinery 
                    
18 The world’s largest producer of bearings is SKF (whose share is 20%) in Sweden. NSK 
follows closely in second place. This is especially true about bearings for general machines 
except for automobiles: SKF 21% and NSK 21% in 1999.  NSK has the largest share (30%) of 
the ballscrew market in the world. THK’s share of the linear-motion guideway production in 




industry is considered.19 This point is well reflected by the fact that the Japanese machine-tool 
industry  was the largest producer in the world one year after the Japanese became the world’s 
largest automakers (1981). 
As is indicated in Rosenberg (1963), the growth stage of manufacturing industries tends to 
be properly projected on the growth of capital goods industries like the machine-tool industry. 
Hence, it was quite probable that the “demanding and knowledgeable” Japanese automakers 
helped greatly to increase the competitiveness of the Japanese machine-tool makers.   
The observation of the past development process of the machine-tool industry, however, 
uncovers a slightly different story. A large amount of the demand for Japanese machine-tools 
came, especially during the late 1970s and the early 1980s, from the US auto and aircraft 
industries. The export ratio of Japanese machine-tools  was just  10% in 1970,  but it exceeded 
40% in 1978 and oscillated between  30 and 40 % during the 1980s.  Eighty percent of 
machine-tools newly consumed in the US were American in 1975, whereas this number 
dropped to 50% in 1985. Most of them were replaced by Japanese machine-tools (Finegold, et. 
al. (1994)).   
The above structure has since not changed very much. Indeed, the preference for  Japanese 
machine-tools has grown. The export ratio of Japanese machine-tools in 1991 was 30%. 
Reflecting the severe drop in  domestic demand, it became 68% in 1995 and 74% in 1999.20 
Moreover, 60% of machine-tools imported  to the US in 1999 were made in Japan.21 In this 
sense, the Japanese machine-tool industry tends to reflect not the domestic but the world 
manufacturing industries.  
Lastly, some researchers (e.g., Graham (1993), Boultinghouse (1994), and Forrant (1997)) 
have emphasized the role of the “Keiretsu” a la Toyota in the Japanese machinetool industry. 
For examples, Boultinghouse (1994) states as follows: 
 
                    
19 The data comes from the Japan Association of Machine-tool Builders and from our field 
research. 
20 The machine-tool import restriction by the USA via VRA (Voluntary Restraint Agreements) 
started in 1987 and ended in 1993. 
21 The data comes from the VDW Annual Report and the Japan Association of Machine-tool 
Builders. In 2000, 47% of Japanese machine-tools were exported to the US, 30% to Europe, and 




Several machine-tool builders are tied to both users and suppliers through both cross 
holdings of equity and long-established trading relationships. For example, Toyoda 
Machinery... Another example is Toshiba Machinery ... (p.17) 
 
Such a statement, however, is a little misleading. Since the early 1980s, the Japanese 
machine-tool industry has been led not by these “Keiretsu”-type makers but by independent 
ones such as Yamazaki Mazak, Mori Machinery, Ohkuma, and Makino Milling Machines.22 For 
example, as far as CNC lathes are concerned, the “Big Three” (Yamazaki Mazak, Mori 
Machinery, and Ohkuma) occupied about 50% of the domestic shares even in 1981. This trend 
has grown stronger in recent years.23  It is also true that many of the “Keiretsu”-related makers  
suffered from a chronic economic depression in the 1990s mainly because they tend to 
specialize in high-class customer-specific machines equipped with their original and 
proprietary CNC.   
 
4. Overlooked Intrafirm Factors for Explaining Leapfrogging Development 
4.1. The Necessity for Simultaneous and Cross-functional Information Sharing 
The innovation process is characterized by cutting-edge activities to achieve market 
success. Such activities are initiated by novel and promising ideas and are realized as concrete 
product specifications, conceptual or accurate drawings, and then as final commercial products. 
Many important players take part in this process. Their  methods of active participation, 
however, are inclined to be concurrent or simultaneous rather than sequential. Indeed, to have 
efficient innovations, it is inevitable to promptly and properly resolve various unknown 
problems along with contradicting cross-functional interests created in the process as early as 
possible. Moreover, to avert the evils of local maximization, global maximization must always 
be given first priority. 
                   
The appearance of high-speed and high-precision CNC complex lathes or MCs in the 1980s 
or 1990s has remarkably increased the necessity for such a global maximization. This is mainly 
because, as the importance of so-called “mechatronics” is drastically increased, even first-rate 
mechanical designers can not foresee various kinds of interference problems among key parts 
at the system design phase.  
 
22 For details, see Miwa (1998). 




Concerning this point, the following statement by a mechanical designer is quite 
informative. He  played an important role in designing various premier products of a large 
machine-tool maker with a proud history:  
                   
 
During the time when traditional non-NC lathes or milling machines were produced, 
machine designers were overconfident of the current standard. This might be mainly 
because the effective way of building these non-NC machines could be theorized to a 
considerable extent by designers. However, as the machines have become equipped with 
CNC and multi-functions as shown in complex CNC lathes or MCs, their theorizing power  
gradually weakened. This tendency has been intensified by the advent of high-speed and 
high-precision machines equipped with ATC (Auto Tool Changers) or APC (Auto Pallet 
Changers). When the machines became complex, designers then had to consider various 
mechanical and electrical factors before the actual building process. This is why the 
present simultaneous and cross-functional information sharing system has begun to play 
an important role. Because the skills of a first-rate assemblyman are more durable than 
those of a machinist, especially during rapid technological change, the power of 
assembling shops has become  greater than before.  
 
The questionnaire survey validates the relevance of the above statement. In the survey, the 
interviewee was asked to agree or disagree with the following statement: “CNC machines have 
become so complex that, without close collaboration with assemblymen and/or machinists 
during the early stages of machine development, D&D engineers can no longer effectively 
develop and design new machines to the finest detail.”  Fifty percent of the Japanese24 and 59% 
of the German makers answered “yes.” The corresponding number for the American makers 
was 37%. 25  The percentage increases if makers are limited to those who have introduced a 
formal concurrent design review (DR) process between the D&D engineers and the 
representatives of the production shops: 64% for Japan, 45% for the US, and 61% for Germany.  
 
24 The Japanese survey was done based on establishments. Among the responding samples, 
only two or three belonged to the same companies. 
25 The number includes makers that did not answer this question. If non-responses are excluded, 
the numbers become 65%, 63%, and 42% respectively. In what follows, every number will 




If the necessity for simultaneous and cross-functional information sharing developed with 
the advent of high-speed and high-precision CNC complex lathes or MCs, the above formal DR 
process must have also been introduced around the late 1980s or the early 1990s. In relation to 
this point, the head of the technology division of  Maker E, a world-famous CNC grinding 
machine producer, pointed out the following supporting fact: 
 
It is an established fact that we highly honor the simultaneous and cross-functional 
information sharing among various departments and divisions. Such a practice was fully 
established just about ten years ago (around 1987) when the so-called TQC became widely 
practiced. Certainly, even before then, people shared a sense of family, and consensus was 
emphasized in various aspects. Nonetheless, the current style of the rather egalitarian 
information sharing system was set up only in the late 1980s. After that, the previous 
sectionalism was really gone, and the cooperative atmosphere was nurtured. Indeed about 
20 to 30 years ago, the technology department had  the power to unilaterally lead the 
production department. At that time engineers in the technology department had 
production workers  carry out their assigned tasks in a paternalistic way. They also had the 
arrogance to state that one only had to faithfully follow their instructions to produce good 
machines. Such a domineering relationship could not have produced any good products. 
As a result, the current design review system has been introduced based on the idea that 
only assembly and machining shops produce actual products; it is here that the drawings 
must be made by taking into account the various constraints of the shops.  
 
What the head of the technological division mentioned above was also confirmed by the 
questionnaire survey. The percentage of makers who have introduced the above formal 
concurrent DR process was 49% in Japan, 60% in the US, and 72% in Germany. Moreover, 
among these makers whose DR processes start even at an early stage, 59% of Japanese makers 
have introduced such a system since 1990. This number adds up to 78% if makers that started 
the DR process since 1980 are included. The corresponding numbers were 48% and 59% for US 
makers and 60% and 67% for German makers.  
Lastly we note the qualitative differences of the above formal DR processes among the 




introduce the process than the Japanese: 60% vs. 49%.26 The difference becomes more salient 
when DR processes start even at an early stage where fundamental machine specs are 
determined: 53% vs. 26%. These numbers, however, do not take into account the frequency of 
meetings between the D&D engineers and the production workers.  
Concerning this point, the survey asked another question: With which in-house department 
do your D&D engineers tend to meet most frequently? Hence, a cross- tabulation between the 
previous question and this question leads to the desired information. The result is striking. 
Among the US makers that have  DR processes even at a very early stage, only 26% of them 
answered “Assembly shops” and 4% “Machining shops.” The “Sales department” was the most 
frequent: 44%. In contrast, the corresponding numbers were 72%, 51%, and 52% respectively 
for the Japanese makers, and 73%, 53%, and 53% for the Germans. American DR processes are 
quite different from those of the Japanese or the Germans.   
 
4.2. Statistical Analysis  
In the previous section, we mentioned that the advent of  high-speed and high-precision 
CNC complex lathes or MCs  necessitated a simultaneous and cross-functional new product 
development process in the 1990s. The main reasons were also articulated. Based on statistical 
analysis, this section will validate the conjecture and further clarify the causes and effects of 
the processes. 
Two dependent variables are introduced: the degree of reduction in the development 
lead-time during the past decade and the degree of decrease in the past decade in the number of 
claims during the 6 months after the start of commercial production.  In the answer, the degrees 
are indicated as: “1. Almost no change, 2. Reduced (or Decreased) about  10-20%, 3. Reduced  
30-40%, 4. Reduced about 50%, 5. Reduced over 50%, 6. I do not know.” In the statistical 
analysis, we defined the two new dummy variables of d_TimeToMarket10 and 
d_TimeToMarket30, which takes a unit value if the development lead-time was reduced more 
than  10-30%, and zero in all other cases. The dummy variable d_NumClaim10 and 
d_NumClaim30 are similarly defined, but for  a number of claims. In estimating the effect on 
these variables, the PROBIT estimation method was applied to both the mixed data and the 
singlecountry data.27    
                    
26 For German makers, the former was72%, while the latter was 47%. 




The independent variables included: (1) differences in countries; (2) methods of training 
assemblymen and machinists; (3) methods of new product development processes; (4) 
departments with which the D&D engineers most frequently meet; (5) overseas production 
facilities; (6) the role of publicly provided off-the-job training; (7) firm size; and (8) 
differences in produced machine-tools. The precise definitions of these variables and their 
basic statistics are provided in Appendix 1.  
 
A. The Estimation Results for the Development Lead-Time 
Table 1 shows the estimation results for the development lead-time in the mixed data. The 
second column indicates the result for d_TimeToMarket10 while the third column is for 
d_TimeToMarket30. The result of the singlecountry data is provided in Table 2-1 for 
d_TimeToMarket10 and in Table 2-2 for d_TimeToMarket30. 
In Table 1, irrespective of the degree of reducing the development lead-time, the US dummy 
(d_US) is positively significant at the 4% level. In contrast, the German dummy (d_Germany) 
is not significant for d_TimeToMarket10, but positively significant at the 1% level for 
d_TimeToMarket30. Hence, both the American and the German makers have succeeded in 
catching up with the Japanese in the 1990s. This confirms the report made by Lippert (1999). 
The dummy variable d_AsmblyIntegrated takes a unit value whenever a maker has a basic 
company policy to train its assemblymen with both major assembly and parts assembly skills. 
In Table 1, this variable is positively significant at the 1% level for d_TimeToMarket10. One of 
the main reasons28 why a maker trains them in this style is that “such assemblymen could 
promptly troubleshoot new and unusual problems occurring in assembly shops.” This was the 
US makers’ top reason (55%). Although the top reason for the Japanese (72%) and the German 
(73%) makers was to keep up with technological innovations, 52% of the Japanese and 53% of 
the German makers still selected the first reason. Hence, the significantly positive effect of 
d_Asmbly Integrated is justified. 
As shown in Table 2-1, the above result, however, is applicable only to the Japanese makers. 
Variable d_AsmblyIntegrated is no longer significant in Table 2-2 and the third column in 
Table 1. These results contrast starkly  with those variables related to the new product 
                                                           
rates were utilized as weights. In the case of  single country data, the usual “probit” command 
with a robust option was employed. 




development processes. In other words, as far as the development lead-time is concerned, the 
ways of producing new products are likely to play a more important role than the ways of 
training assemblymen.  
It is said that handscraping is always one of the most difficult craft-type assembly skills. 
The dummy variable d_HandScraping takes a unit value whenever a maker agrees with this 
statement. In the third column of Table 1, this variable gives a significantly negative effect. As 
indicated in Tables 2-1 and 2-2, such a negatively significant result is only applicable to the 
Japanese makers. In the present, there are a limited number of assemblymen who are very 
skilled at handscraping. This is mainly because the revolutionary guideways originally 
invented by THK  have drastically reduced the necessity for handscraping. The high-class 
heavy-duty machines for powerful cutting, however, are still likely to use the conventional 
slide-type guideways that inevitably require advanced handscraping skills. Thus, the negative 
significance is acceptable.  
The dummy variable d_MultiSkilled takes a unit value whenever a maker answers yes to the 
following question: “Do your machinists tend to be multifunctional-- responsible for different 
types of machines.” This variable is not significant in any tables. As was said about the variable 
d_AsmblyIntegrated, the ways of producing new products might play a more important role 
than the way the machinists were trained. 
The difference in information-sharing methods is expressed by the dummy variable 
d_EarliestDRPat  that takes a unit value whenever a maker has introduced the formal 
simultaneous design review (DR) process between D&D engineers and representatives of the 
production shops and also whenever such DR processes start at an early stage where 
fundamental machine specs are determined. In Table 1, irrespective of the degree of reducing 
the development lead-time, this variable is positively significant at the 1% level. Shown in 
Table 2-1 for d_TimeToMarket10, this result is limited to the US makers. This result is 
seemingly contradictory to the argument in the previous section. In Table 2, however, 
d_TimeToMarket30 becomes positively significant for both the US and the Japanese makers. In 
other words, for the Japanese makers, the larger the reduction in the development lead-time, the 
more significant the role of d_EarliestDRPat. This is quite understandable. 
As for the departments with which the D&D engineers most frequently meet, both variables 
d_MostMachining and d_MostMarketing are positively significant in Table 1. The former 
implies machining shops and the latter the sales departments. In contrast, d_MostAssembly, the 




very different when the estimation is done for each country. As shown in Table 2-1 and Table 
2-2, for both d_TimeToMarket10 and d_TimeToMarket30, the variable d_MostAssembly is 
quite positively significant for the Japanese makers, whereas not at all for the US makers. 
Moreover, for d_TimeToMarket30, only d_MostAssembly is significant among the three 
variables.29  Hence, assembly shops play a very critical role  with the Japanese makers during 
the new machine development processes. 
The dummy variable d_TQCorTQM takes a unit value whenever TQC or TQM is introduced 
by a maker. TQC or TQM is a company-wide activity that tries to effectively obtain product 
and/or process innovations through full employer-employee participation. Hence, if it is 
properly institutionalized, the effect should be positive. As predicted in Table 1, this variable 
becomes significantly positive at the 1% level for d_TimeToMarket30. This result strongly 
reflects the characteristics of the Japanese makers. In both Tables 2-1 and 2-2, d_TQCorTQM 
is quite significant for the Japanese makers, whereas not at all for the US makers. The result 
indicates that TQC or TQM activities might be quite different between the Japanese and the US 
makers. 
The dummy variable d_OverseaProduct takes a unit value whenever a maker has production 
facilities overseas. In Table 1, this variable is quite significant for both d_TimeToMarket10 and 
d_TimeToMarket30. As indicated in Table 2-1 and Table 2-2, however, this is only applicable 
to the US makers. This result is difficult to explain. Like Gleason and Ingesol, US makers that 
operate overseas production tend to be more competitive. The statistic might reflect this fact. 
Whenever a maker is using public training facilities to train its workers off-the-job, the 
dummy variable d_UsePublicOffJT takes a unit value. This variable is not significant in any 
tables. Troubleshooting abilities of skilled workers are normally accumulated by in-house OJT. 
The analysis reconfirms this fact. 
The variable FirmEmpScale considers several discreet values of full-time employees  with 
each maker. The larger the values, the greater the firm-scale. This variable is  not significant in 
the second or third columns in Table2. In Table 2-1, it becomes positively significant only for 
the Japanese makers, but  this significance disappears in Table 2-2. In this sense, the speed of 
innovation normally does not depend on the size of machine-tool makers.  
                    
29 In Table 2-1 and Table 2-2, variable d_MostMachining is dropped because only a few of the 
US makers meet most frequently with the representatives of machining shops during new 




In Table 1, the dummy variables from d_Lathe to d_OtherMachine indicate the type of 
machine-tools produced by each maker. When a maker produces several types of machines, the 
corresponding variables take a unit value. Moreover, CNC and non-CNC machines are treated 
identically even within the same type of machine. Hence, the variables do not fully portray 
each maker.  
Despite such a constraint, in the second column of Table 1 variables such as d_Machining, 
d_DrillBroaching, d_OtherMetalCut, and d_SpindSlide are positively significant for 
d_TimeToMarket10. Functions of the recent drilling or broaching machines tend to be 
incorporated into MCs. Hence, the positive significance of both the MCs and the drilling or 
broaching machines is understandable. We should note, however, that none of these variables 
are significant for the US makers (see Table 2-1 and Table 2-2). Moreover, even for the 
Japanese makers, only d_Grinding (grinding machines) is positively significant. According to 
these results, the difference in types of machines does not have a significant impact. Lastly we 
note that grinding machines were effectively equipped with CNC in the 1990s and that many 
horning or lapping machines (d_HornLapping) are still not equipped with CNC. Thus, the 
positive significance of the former and the negative significance of the latter are 
comprehensible to some extent. 
 
B. The Estimation Results for The Number of Claims 
The estimation results for the degree of decrease in the number of claims during the 6 
months after the start of commercial production are shown in Table 3 for the mixed data and 
Table 4-1 and Table 4-2 for each country.  
Initially, the US dummy variable (d_US) is significantly negative at the 1% level in both the 
second and the third columns in Table 1. In contrast, the German dummy (d_Germany) is not 
significant in either case. This result indicates that, even during the 1990s, US makers  did not  
catch up with the Japanese, while the Germans  were comparable to the Japanese.  
In Table 1, regarding other independent variables, the significant variables are almost the 
same for both the above 10% and 30% cases except for types of machine variables. The 
significant variables are the following: d_AsmblyIntegrated, d_MultiSkilled, d_EarliestDRPat, 
d_MostMachining, and d_TQCorTQM. This result means that the number of claims tends to be 
significantly decreased in machine-tool makers where: (a) both assemblymen and machinists 
are broadly trained; (b) TQC or TQM is actively introduced; (c) the early participation of 




representatives from machining shops during the new machine development processes.  
Once again, however, in Table 4-1 and Table 4-2, the above results are only applicable to 
Japanese makers. Indeed, in both tables the only commonly significant variable for the US 
makers is d_AsmblyIntegrated. In contrast, for the Japanese makers, d_AsmblyIntegrated, 
d_EarliestDRPat, d_TQCorTQM, and d_MostMarketing are positively significant in Table 4-1, 
while d_EarliestDRPat and d_TQCorTQM are significant in Table 4-2. In these ways, the 
decrease in the number of claims for the Japanese makers is attained mainly through 
simultaneous and cross-functional information sharing and TQC activities through full 
employer-employee participation. On the other hand, US makers still tend to depend solely on 
the troubleshooting abilities of skilled assemblymen. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion  
Through  extensive field research and an original international questionnaire, the main 
sources of the leapfrogging development of the Japanese machine-tool industry in the past 19 
years were investigated.  Past studies have emphasized the following “interfirm factors”: the 
strategic R&D alliance with superlative CNC makers; the extensive use of outsourcing from 
excellent precision parts’ suppliers; and the extraordinary development of automakers. This 
paper critically considered these factors and reconfirmed that, although Japanese machine-tool 
makers were very weak until the early 1970s, they overcame such weakness by both  R&D 
collaboration with powerful CNC makers and  extensive outsourcing from excellent precision 
parts’ makers.     
At the same time, however, the paper also verified the inadequacy of these factors  in 
explaining the further development of this industry in the 1990s. Hence, attention was paid to 
the significant roles of “intrafirm factors” such as: (a) the simultaneous and cross-functional 
information-sharing system at an early stage of the new product development processes; (b) the 
positive and early participation of frontline skilled workers in assembly or machining shops; 
and (c) the existence of highly skilled assemblymen or machinists. The significant roles of 
these intrafirm factors were robustly validated by the statistical analysis of the questionnaire 
survey as well as by the results of our field research. The result showed striking similarities 
between the Japanese and the German  machine-tool makers and notable dissimilarities 
between the two and the US makers. 
In the statistical analysis, two dependent variables were introduced: the degree of decrease 




commercial production in the past decade. The estimation results clarified that, for both the 
development lead-time and the number of claims,  methods of developing new products are 
likely to play a more significant role than the ways  in which  assemblymen or machinists are 
trained. Such a tendency was more prominent in Japan than in the US.  
Similarly, regarding the development lead-time, both the active participation of assembly 
shops in new product development processes and  TQC or TQM activities played a very critical 
role for the Japanese makers. Instead, for the US makers these group-oriented factors did not  
have any significance at all. The decrease in the number of claims for the Japanese makers was 
mainly earned through  simultaneous and cross-functional information sharing and  TQC or 
TQM activities. The US makers, on the other hand, still tended to solely depend on the 
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Table 1: Probit Estimation about Development Lead-Time    
        
     Number of obs  =       655 
Dependent Variables         d_TimeToMarket10          d_TimeToMarket30 
Explanatory Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|  Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| 
d_US 0.330 0.159 0.04  0.340 0.169 0.04 
d_Germany -0.155 0.269 0.57  0.672 0.255 0.01 
d_HandScraping -0.037 0.139 0.79  -0.390 0.145 0.01 
d_AsmblyIntegrated 0.346 0.139 0.01  0.015 0.149 0.92 
d_MultiSkilled 0.181 0.131 0.17  0.150 0.138 0.28 
d_EarliestDRPat 0.526 0.132 0.00  0.617 0.128 0.00 
d_MostAssembly 0.130 0.128 0.31  0.009 0.135 0.95 
d_MostMachining 0.442 0.145 0.00  0.382 0.142 0.01 
d_MostMarketing 0.432 0.118 0.00  0.258 0.121 0.03 
d_TQCorTQM 0.141 0.118 0.23  0.349 0.118 0.00 
d_OverseaProduct 0.506 0.212 0.02  0.547 0.183 0.00 
d_UsePublicOffJT 0.056 0.123 0.65  -0.138 0.128 0.28 
FirmEmpScale 0.064 0.048 0.18  0.042 0.047 0.37 
d_Lathes -0.179 0.178 0.31  -0.129 0.179 0.47 
d_Machining 0.315 0.192 0.10  0.182 0.186 0.33 
d_DrilBroaching 0.525 0.226 0.02  -0.036 0.256 0.89 
d_Grinding -0.045 0.187 0.81  0.384 0.192 0.05 
d_HornLapping -0.365 0.315 0.25  -1.000 0.377 0.01 
d_EDM -0.236 0.338 0.49  0.238 0.385 0.54 
d_Boring -0.159 0.298 0.59  0.181 0.307 0.56 
d_OtherMetalCut 0.382 0.189 0.04  0.277 0.183 0.13 
d_SpindSlide 0.306 0.158 0.05  0.174 0.165 0.29 
d_PuchShear -0.588 0.300 0.05  -0.225 0.349 0.52 
d_MetalForming 0.184 0.152 0.23  0.123 0.160 0.44 
d_OtherMachine 0.069 0.133 0.60  0.164 0.142 0.25 





Table 2-1: Probit Estimation about Development Lead-Time   
<Japanese & American Machine-tool makers: above 10% >   
        
 Number of obs    =    464     Number of obs    =     157  
  Japanese Makers   US Makers  
Dependent Variables         d_TimeToMarket10          d_TimeToMarket10 
Explanatory Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|z|  Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| 
d_HandScraping 0.064 0.148 0.67  0.112 0.369 0.76 
d_AsmblyIntegrated 0.467 0.178 0.01  0.069 0.268 0.80 
d_MultiSkilled 0.149 0.141 0.29  0.122 0.294 0.68 
d_EarliestDRPat 0.092 0.158 0.56  0.825 0.274 0.00 
d_MostAssembly 0.395 0.141 0.01  0.138 0.373 0.71 
d_MostMachining 0.318 0.141 0.03     
d_MostMarketing 0.401 0.131 0.00  0.603 0.297 0.04 
d_TQCorTQM 0.291 0.135 0.03  0.027 0.240 0.91 
d_OverseaProduct 0.349 0.244 0.15  1.674 0.496 0.00 
d_UsePublicOffJT 0.087 0.150 0.56  0.289 0.256 0.26 
FirmEmpScale 0.091 0.053 0.09  0.032 0.122 0.79 
d_Lathes -0.141 0.203 0.49  -0.579 0.635 0.36 
d_Machining 0.404 0.227 0.08  0.397 0.594 0.50 
d_DrilBroaching 0.679 0.272 0.01  0.179 0.423 0.67 
d_Grinding 0.101 0.213 0.64  0.015 0.414 0.97 
d_HornLapping -0.567 0.409 0.17  0.652 0.573 0.26 
d_EDM -0.377 0.348 0.28  -0.854 0.796 0.28 
d_Boring 0.086 0.344 0.80  -0.168 0.461 0.72 
d_OtherMetalCut 0.390 0.202 0.05  0.704 0.419 0.09 
d_SpindSlide 0.390 0.179 0.03  -0.029 0.393 0.94 
d_PuchShear -0.231 0.328 0.48  -0.791 0.733 0.28 
d_MetalForming 0.244 0.162 0.13  0.477 0.499 0.34 
d_OtherMachine 0.217 0.151 0.15  -0.314 0.347 0.36 
constant -1.558 0.272 0.00  -0.949 0.460 0.04 
        





Table 2-2: Probit Estimation about Development Lead-Time   
<Japanese & American Machine-tool makers: above 30% >   
        
 Number of obs    =    464     Number of obs    =     157  
  Japanese Makers   US Makers  
Dependent Variables         d_TimeToMarket30          d_TimeToMarket30 
Explanatory Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|z|  Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| 
d_HandScraping -0.423 0.152 0.01  -0.396 0.379 0.30 
d_AsmblyIntegrated -0.260 0.188 0.17  0.055 0.271 0.84 
d_MultiSkilled 0.166 0.154 0.28  -0.011 0.315 0.97 
d_EarliestDRPat 0.300 0.157 0.06  0.774 0.269 0.00 
d_MostAssembly 0.254 0.153 0.10  0.404 0.335 0.23 
d_MostMachining 0.168 0.148 0.26     
d_MostMarketing 0.119 0.136 0.38  0.745 0.268 0.01 
d_TQCorTQM 0.476 0.138 0.00  0.079 0.248 0.75 
d_OverseaProduct 0.420 0.222 0.06  1.370 0.388 0.00 
d_UsePublicOffJT -0.142 0.158 0.37  0.079 0.258 0.76 
FirmEmpScale 0.054 0.050 0.28  0.062 0.123 0.62 
d_Lathes -0.338 0.219 0.12  0.018 0.484 0.97 
d_Machining -0.006 0.224 0.98  0.151 0.472 0.75 
d_DrilBroaching -0.220 0.326 0.50  -0.059 0.452 0.90 
d_Grinding 0.523 0.217 0.02  0.791 0.390 0.04 
d_HornLapping -0.876 0.423 0.04  -0.706 0.711 0.32 
d_EDM -0.220 0.472 0.64  -0.328 0.907 0.72 
d_Boring 0.488 0.366 0.18  0.255 0.521 0.62 
d_OtherMetalCut 0.413 0.195 0.03  0.155 0.378 0.68 
d_SpindSlide 0.268 0.179 0.14  -0.568 0.401 0.16 
d_PuchShear 0.002 0.412 1.00  -0.230 0.715 0.75 
d_MetalForming -0.028 0.176 0.88  0.766 0.422 0.07 
d_OtherMachine 0.115 0.159 0.47  0.283 0.397 0.48 
constant -1.302 0.269 0.00  -1.816 0.470 0.00 
        





Table 3: Probit Estimation about the Number of Claims during the First 6 
Months  
        
     Number of obs  =       655 
Dependent Variables  d_NumClaim10   d_NumClaim30 
Explanatory Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|t|  Coef. Std. Err. P>|t| 
d_US -0.946 0.172 0.00  -0.618 0.195 0.00 
d_Germany -0.396 0.261 0.13  -0.120 0.278 0.67 
d_HandScraping -0.020 0.129 0.88  -0.225 0.138 0.11 
d_AsmblyIntegrated 0.471 0.147 0.00  0.410 0.161 0.01 
d_MultiSkilled 0.205 0.127 0.11  0.248 0.134 0.07 
d_EarliestDRPat 0.382 0.134 0.00  0.269 0.134 0.05 
d_MostAssembly -0.120 0.127 0.35  -0.178 0.133 0.18 
d_MostMachining 0.379 0.133 0.01  0.363 0.135 0.01 
d_MostMarketing 0.100 0.117 0.39  0.124 0.122 0.31 
d_TQCorTQM 0.492 0.116 0.00  0.377 0.120 0.00 
d_OverseaProduct -0.035 0.196 0.86  0.221 0.200 0.27 
d_UsePublicOffJT 0.039 0.125 0.76  -0.186 0.131 0.16 
FirmEmpScale -0.068 0.048 0.16  -0.079 0.052 0.13 
d_Lathes 0.036 0.177 0.84  0.028 0.188 0.88 
d_Machining 0.067 0.186 0.72  0.238 0.196 0.23 
d_DrilBroaching -0.041 0.243 0.87  -0.431 0.297 0.15 
d_Grinding 0.239 0.183 0.19  0.424 0.194 0.03 
d_HornLapping -0.235 0.327 0.47  -0.750 0.359 0.04 
d_EDM -0.133 0.304 0.66  0.380 0.326 0.24 
d_Boring 0.256 0.278 0.36  0.373 0.312 0.23 
d_OtherMetalCut 0.259 0.171 0.13  0.106 0.175 0.55 
d_SpindSlide 0.015 0.153 0.92  -0.091 0.175 0.60 
d_PuchShear -0.010 0.318 0.98  -0.038 0.355 0.91 
d_MetalForming 0.154 0.149 0.30  0.301 0.160 0.06 
d_OtherMachine 0.048 0.130 0.71  0.114 0.132 0.39 
constant -0.686 0.222 0.00  -1.257 0.242 0.00 
        





Table 4-1: Probit Estimation about the Number of Claims during the First 6 
Months  
<Japanese & American Machine-tool makers: above 10% >   
        
 Number of obs    =    464     Number of obs    =     157  
  Japanese Makers   US Makers  
Dependent Variables  d_NumClaim10   d_NumClaim10 
Explanatory Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|z|  Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| 
d_HandScraping 0.085 0.144 0.56  -0.395 0.402 0.33 
d_AsmblyIntegrated 0.478 0.177 0.01  0.645 0.266 0.02 
d_MultiSkilled 0.069 0.139 0.62  -0.021 0.309 0.95 
d_EarliestDRPat 0.401 0.154 0.01  0.192 0.279 0.49 
d_MostAssembly 0.076 0.141 0.59  -0.308 0.369 0.40 
d_MostMachining 0.202 0.137 0.14  -0.216 0.629 0.73 
d_MostMarketing 0.248 0.129 0.05  0.409 0.300 0.17 
d_TQCorTQM 0.479 0.133 0.00  0.342 0.258 0.19 
d_OverseaProduct -0.267 0.214 0.21  0.216 0.388 0.58 
d_UsePublicOffJT 0.211 0.147 0.15  -0.085 0.285 0.76 
FirmEmpScale -0.061 0.051 0.23  0.025 0.124 0.84 
d_Lathes 0.030 0.198 0.88  0.233 0.483 0.63 
d_Machining 0.332 0.216 0.12  -0.531 0.478 0.27 
d_DrilBroaching -0.126 0.291 0.67  0.010 0.434 0.98 
d_Grinding -0.085 0.203 0.68  0.796 0.348 0.02 
d_HornLapping -0.222 0.398 0.58  -0.397 0.762 0.60 
d_EDM 0.603 0.441 0.17     
d_Boring 0.403 0.360 0.26  0.558 0.569 0.33 
d_OtherMetalCut 0.168 0.184 0.36  0.768 0.441 0.08 
d_SpindSlide -0.016 0.174 0.93  -0.072 0.402 0.86 
d_PuchShear 0.457 0.402 0.26  -0.576 0.707 0.42 
d_MetalForming 0.048 0.157 0.76  0.529 0.388 0.17 
d_OtherMachine 0.076 0.145 0.60  -0.493 0.512 0.34 
constant -0.746 0.252 0.00  -1.602 0.450 0.00 





Table 4-2: Probit Estimation about the Number of Claims during the First 6 
Months  
<Japanese & American Machine-tool makers: above 30% >   
        
 Number of obs    =    464     Number of obs    =     157  
  Japanese Makers   US 
Makers 
 
Dependent Variables  d_NumClaim30   d_NumClaim30 
Explanatory Variables Coef. Std. Err. P>|z|  Coef. Std. Err. P>|z| 
d_HandScraping -0.019 0.144 0.89  -1.071 0.607 0.08 
d_AsmblyIntegrated 0.311 0.193 0.11  1.271 0.370 0.00 
d_MultiSkilled 0.059 0.148 0.69  0.051 0.417 0.90 
d_EarliestDRPat 0.415 0.150 0.01  -0.109 0.374 0.77 
d_MostAssembly 0.015 0.143 0.92  -0.807 0.426 0.06 
d_MostMachining 0.124 0.142 0.38  0.722 0.637 0.26 
d_MostMarketing 0.188 0.132 0.16  0.908 0.406 0.03 
d_TQCorTQM 0.464 0.133 0.00  0.207 0.346 0.55 
d_OverseaProduct -0.026 0.220 0.90  0.601 0.605 0.32 
d_UsePublicOffJT -0.076 0.150 0.61  -0.344 0.411 0.40 
FirmEmpScale -0.066 0.052 0.20  -0.153 0.152 0.32 
d_Lathes -0.001 0.203 1.00  0.180 0.527 0.73 
d_Machining 0.138 0.229 0.55  0.629 0.626 0.32 
d_DrilBroaching -0.706 0.329 0.03  -0.123 0.621 0.84 
d_Grinding -0.076 0.204 0.71  1.187 0.494 0.02 
d_HornLapping -0.308 0.432 0.48     
d_EDM 1.012 0.418 0.02   
d_Boring 0.620 0.387 0.11  0.710 0.782 0.36 
d_OtherMetalCut 0.132 0.185 0.48  0.413 0.646 0.52 
d_SpindSlide -0.036 0.184 0.84  -0.159 0.903 0.86 
d_PuchShear 0.025 0.389 0.95  -0.654 1.053 0.54 
d_MetalForming 0.026 0.167 0.88  1.381 0.494 0.01 
d_OtherMachine 0.164 0.151 0.28     







Appendix 1• Basic Statistics and Definition of Variables 
 
       
Variable Mean  Variable DefinitionS.D.         
d_TimeToMarket10 0.54  0.50  Development lead time decreased more than 10% in 10 years    
d_TimeToMarket30 0.28  0.45  Development leadtime decreased more than 30% in 10 years    
d_NumClaim10 0.44  0.50  Number of claims during the first 6 months decreased more than 10% in 10 years  
d_NumClaim30 0.24  0.42  Number of claims during the first 6 months decreased more than 30% in 10 years  
d_Protype10 0.58  0.49  Period for prototype-making decreased more than 10% in 10 years     
d_Protype30 0.34  0.47  Period for prototype-making decreased more than 30% in 10 years     
d_US 0.22  0.42  US Dummy Variable        
d_Germany 0.04  0.21  Germany Dummy Variable       
d_HandScraping 0.21  0.41  (Difficult) Handscraping is necessary for assemblymen     
d_AsmblyIntegrated 0.69  0.46  Normally assemblymen are trained for both major and parts assembly   
d_MultiSkilled 0.67  0.47  Try to make machinists multiskilled      
d_EarliestDRPat 0.33  0.47  D&D people simultaneously meet with production workers     
d_MostAssembly 0.36  0.48  Design & Development(D&D) people most frequently meet assemblymen in the Design Review 
(DR) 
d_MostMachining 0.25  0.43  D&D people most frequently meet machinists in the DR     
d_MostMarketing 0.37  0.48  D&D people most frequently meet marketing or sales people in the DR   
d_TQCorTQM 0.39  0.49  TQC or TQM is introduced       
d_OverseaProduct 0.11  0.31  Overseas production is conducted      
d_UsePublicOffJT 0.34  0.47  Using publicly provided Off-the-job training opportunities     
FirmEmpScale 3.05  1.38  Firm scale by Fulltimers       
d_Lathes 0.16  0.37  Making lathes        
d_Machining 0.15  0.36  Making machining centers       
d_DrilBroaching 0.07  0.25  Making drilling or broaching machines      
d_Grinding 0.12  0.33  Making grinding machines       
d_HornLapping 0.03  0.18  Making horning or lapping machines      
d_EDM 0.03  0.16  Making EDM (electric discharge machines)      
d_Boring 0.04  0.19  Making boring machines       
d_OtherMetalCut 0.13  0.33  Making other metal cutting machines      
d_SpindSlide 0.13  0.34  Making spindles or slides ( guideways)      
d_PuchShear 0.03  0.17  Making punching machines or shears      
d_MetalForming 0.20  0.40  Making metal forming machines       
d_OtherMachine 0.30  0.46  Making other types of machines       
 
 
